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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Clarence Powell was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1951, for two robberies of business owners in 
their homes.  He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
establish that the robberies affected interstate commerce and 
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the jury charge.  At issue is whether a different standard 
governs the Act’s jurisdictional requirements when the 
robbery of business proceeds occurs in the business owner’s 
home rather than on business premises. 
I. 
 In the summer of 2008, according to the testimony of 
Powell’s cousin and codefendant Michael Lassiter, he and 
Powell engaged in a series of home robberies of college 
students and drug dealers in North Philadelphia.  Powell and 
Lassiter decided their crimes were attracting too much 
attention from law enforcement.  They determined instead to 
rob business owners by following them from their retail stores 
to their homes, reasoning that there would be less security, 
fewer witnesses, and more money from the business in 
owners’ houses than in their stores.  They specifically 
targeted immigrant business owners in the belief that those 
they termed “Chinese people” would keep business proceeds 
at home because they did not use banks. 
 In November 2008, Powell, Lassiter, and codefendant 
Troy Hill cased Star Wigs, a store on 52nd Street in West 
Philadelphia, and decided to rob the owner when they saw the 
store’s brisk business.  Star Wigs was owned by Y.B., a 
female immigrant from Korea who would take home cash 
from the business each evening to later deposit in the bank.  
The store sold merchandise, principally wigs and hair care 
products, from multiple out-of-state suppliers, including 
suppliers in New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.  On 
December 1, Powell, Lassiter, and Hill followed Y.B. as she 
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drove from Star Wigs to her home in Broomall, Pennsylvania.  
The three men, wearing bandanas over their faces and 
brandishing two handguns, invaded the home, beat and tied 
up Y.B. and her husband, and demanded money.  The robbers 
seized $250-$300 in cash from the store’s daily sales from 
Y.B.’s sock, and approximately $2000 in cash from store 
sales in a jar on the refrigerator, which Y.B. intended to 
deposit in the bank to cover backdated checks for store 
merchandise.1
 Also in November 2008, Powell, Lassiter, and Hill 
cased Dollar Plus Discount, a store located across 52nd Street 
from Star Wigs, similarly observing a large volume of 
business.  Dollar Plus was owned by B.S. and his wife, 
immigrants from Bangladesh, and purchased merchandise 
from out-of-state suppliers, including electronics and other 
items from Baltimore, Maryland.  B.S. transported cash and 
credit card receipts from the store to his home each night in a 
clear plastic box, where he kept them overnight.  In late 
November, Powell, Lassiter, and Hill followed B.S. and his 
wife from Dollar Plus to their home in Upper Darby, 
Pennsylvania.  Several weeks later, on December 18, the 
three men, along with Alexis Byrd-Arroyo, Lassiter’s 
  They also took credit cards, a handgun, 
jewelry, handbags, family heirlooms, and $1200 in cash that 
belonged to Y.B.’s husband. 
                                              
1 The amount of cash in the jar is disputed.  Y.B. testified that 
it was approximately $2,000 but submitted an insurance claim 
for $1,060.  When questioned about the discrepancy, Y.B. 
explained that she did not know at the time she submitted the 
claim how much money was in the jar. 
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girlfriend, returned to B.S.’s house armed with two handguns 
and a sawed-off shotgun.   Powell, Lassiter, and Hill hid at 
the back of the house and assaulted two of B.S.’s adult 
daughters when they came home, pushing them inside at 
gunpoint and demanding their parents’ money.2  One of the 
daughters led Lassiter upstairs to the plastic box with receipts 
and petty cash from the business.3
 B.S.’s daughters then called the police, who put out a 
radio alert for a robbery in progress.  Within thirty seconds of 
the dispatch, Upper Darby police on patrol a few blocks from 
B.S.’s house spotted a Ford Crown Victoria driving rapidly 
toward Philadelphia.  They tailed the car into the city and 
recorded its license plate, but lost the car in traffic.  Upper 
Darby police relayed this information to the Philadelphia 
police, who later located and set up surveillance on the parked 
vehicle.  Philadelphia police arrested Byrd-Arroyo when she 
returned to the car, and Upper Darby police obtained a search 
warrant for the vehicle.  Inside they discovered a handgun, a 
sawed-off shotgun, a plastic container with Dollar Plus 
receipts and petty cash, and other valuables.  The victims of 
the December 18 robbery identified the items recovered as 
  The robbers took this box 
along with personal electronics and additional cash, pushed 
the women into a room, threatening to shoot them if they 
came out, and left. 
                                              
2 A third adult daughter was already present in the home. 
3 At the time of the robbery, neither the robbers nor B.S. 
knew how much money the box contained.  The police 
subsequently determined the box contained $140 in small 
bills. 
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proceeds of the robbery.  Based on information from Byrd-
Arroyo, police subsequently arrested Powell, Lassiter, and 
Hill. 
 In March 2010, a grand jury in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania returned a five-count indictment against 
Clarence Powell: one count of conspiracy to interfere with 
interstate commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1951(a), two counts of interference with interstate commerce 
by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and two 
counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  Powell proceeded to trial.  
At the close of the evidence, the District Court held a 
charging conference with trial counsel.  Powell moved to 
dismiss the indictment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 for 
insufficient evidence to establish the effect on interstate 
commerce.  The District Court denied the motion.  Over the 
defendant’s objection, the court charged the jury with a 
modified version of the Third Circuit model jury instruction 
on the element of “affecting interstate commerce” required 
for a Hobbs Act conviction.  The jury convicted Powell on all 
five counts.  The District Court sentenced Powell to 697 
months’ imprisonment,4
                                              
4 The District Court sentenced Powell to ninety-seven months 
of imprisonment for the Hobbs Act convictions, Counts One, 
Two, and Four of Powell’s indictment.  This sentence was the 
bottom of the recommended range of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  The District Court sentenced Powell to 600 
months’ imprisonment for the convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c), Counts Three and Five.  Because Powell had a 
 with five years’ supervised release, 
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restitution of $20,762.55, and a special assessment of $500.  
Powell timely appealed.5
II. 
 
 On appeal, Powell challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to satisfy the effect on interstate commerce element 
required for conviction under the Hobbs Act, as well as the 
jury instructions on this element.  These challenges raise a 
similar issue: namely, whether the robbery of an individual in 
her home requires proof of a more substantial connection to 
interstate commerce than a robbery committed at a place of 
business. 
A. 
  The Hobbs Act provides “[w]hoever in any way or 
degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the 
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by 
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do . . . 
                                                                                                     
previous conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the mandatory 
minimum sentence for each count was 300 months.  18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).  Moreover, the statute specifies that 
all terms of imprisonment under § 924 must run 
consecutively, including the term of imprisonment imposed 
for the underlying crime of violence.  Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).  
Powell does not challenge the District Court’s sentence in this 
appeal. 
5 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
twenty years, or both.”  18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  The statute 
defines commerce as “all commerce between any point in a 
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and 
any point outside thereof; all commerce between points 
within the same State through any place outside such State; 
and all other commerce over which the United States has 
jurisdiction.”  Id. § 1951(b)(3).  We have held that a 
conviction under the Hobbs Act requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant knowingly or 
willfully committed, or attempted or conspired to commit, 
robbery or extortion, and (2) the defendant’s conduct affected 
interstate commerce.  United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 
178-79 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Driggs, 823 F.2d 52, 
54 (3d Cir. 1987).  Powell challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence with respect to the effect on interstate commerce 
element.6
 The Hobbs Act was passed as an amendment to the 
Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979.  The 
original Act was targeted at extortion by organized crime 
against store owners and truck drivers.  S. Rep. No. 75-1189, 
   
                                              
6 We apply a “particularly deferential standard of review” to 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
conviction.  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 
1998).  We view all evidence in the light most favorable to 
the government, and sustain conviction as long as “any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
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at 23-24 (1937).  But in a later prosecution under the Act 
against a labor union and twenty-six of its members who 
coerced tribute from out-of-state truck drivers entering New 
York City, the Supreme Court held that the Act did not 
encompass payments for work, even if obtained by threats or 
violence, and reversed the defendants’ convictions.  United 
States v. Local 807 of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 
(1942).  Congress then amended the law to correct the 
“technical defect in the antiracketeering statute,” 91 Cong. 
Rec. 11,913 (1945) (statement of Rep. Whittington), and 
“protect interstate commerce and free the highways and 
streets of this country of robbers,” id. at 11,912 (statement of 
Rep. Hobbs); Hobbs Act, ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (1946), 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 
 Although the Hobbs Act was framed in the context of 
racketeering, the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress 
intended the law to sweep broadly and “prevent anyone from 
obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce, or the 
movement of any article or commodity in commerce by 
robbery or extortion as defined in the bill.”  United States v. 
Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 377 (1978) (emphasis removed) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 79-238, at 9 (1945)).  Based on this 
legislative history, the Court has declined to read a 
racketeering requirement into the statute, holding that the 
statute’s words “do not lend themselves to restrictive 
interpretation” and instead “manifest . . . a purpose to use all 
the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference 
with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery, or physical 
violence.”  Id. at 373 (alteration in original) (quoting Stirone 
v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960)). 
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 Consistent with the Court’s interpretation of the Hobbs 
Act’s “broad language,” Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215, we have 
stressed that “proof of a de minimis effect on interstate 
commerce is all that is required” for conviction under the 
Hobbs Act.  Walker, 657 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. 
Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 766 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Moreover, the effect may be potential, not 
actual. United States v. Shavers, No. 10-2790, slip op. at 11 
(3d Cir. Aug. 27, 2012); United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 
200, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Urban, 404 F.3d at 766-
67.  We have noted this standard is in accord with the 
overwhelming weight of authority of our sister circuits.  
Urban, 404 F.3d at 765 n.3.  We have also rejected challenges 
to this standard under the commerce clause jurisprudence 
outlined in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), holding that, 
because the Hobbs Act contains a jurisdictional element and 
criminalizes the “fundamentally economic” crimes of robbery 
and extortion, violations of the Act have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce in the aggregate, and the government 
need not prove a substantial effect in each individual case.  
Shavers, No. 10-2790, slip op. at 11-12, Walker, 657 F.3d at 
179-80; Urban, 404 F.3d at 766; United States v. Clausen, 
328 F.3d 708, 710-11 (3d Cir. 2003). 
    Powell challenges the application of the de minimis 
standard in this case.  He argues it properly applies only to 
robberies at business establishments, and that a higher 
jurisdictional burden applies when, as here, the robbery in 
question is of an individual in his or her home.  For support, 
he cites cases from our sister circuits finding that the robbery 
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of a private individual’s property away from a place of 
business did not satisfy the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional 
element.  See, e.g., United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 
(2d Cir. 2002) (extortion of personal funds from a private 
individual); United States v. Quigley, 53 F.3d 909, 910 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (robbery of personal funds of two individuals en 
route to a liquor store); United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 
100 (5th Cir. 1994) (home robbery of personal property and 
car).  Most notable among this line of cases is United States v. 
Wang, 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000), which reversed a 
conviction under the Hobbs Act for the defendant’s robbery 
of a restaurant owner in her home that secured $4200 in cash, 
including $1200 from the restaurant’s cash register, $900 of 
which was to be deposited in the restaurant’s bank account 
the next day.  The court held the standard for the effect on 
interstate commerce of the robbery of an individual “is of a 
different order than in cases in which the victim is a business 
entity,” and ruled that, when the prosecution “seeks to satisfy 
the Act’s jurisdictional nexus by showing a connection 
between an individual victim and a business engaged in 
interstate commerce, that connection must be a substantial 
one—not one that is fortuitous or speculative.”  Wang, 222 
F.3d at 238-40.  The robbery in question did not satisfy this 
standard because the robbery was of a private individual in a 
private home, and there was no evidence of a substantial 
connection between the robbery and the restaurant’s business.  
Id. at 240. 
 We have addressed this line of cases before.  In 
Walker, we noted that, “[e]ven if these decisions are correct,” 
a question we declined to decide, they were distinguishable 
12 
 
from the Walker facts, which involved the robbery of a drug 
dealer.  657 F.3d at 181.  We interpreted the Wang line of 
cases to stand for the proposition that  
the mere facts that (1) an individual was robbed 
of personal property, (2) the individual happens 
to work for a company engaged in interstate 
commerce, and (3) there was some incidental 
effect on that person’s job performance are 
insufficient, standing alone, to establish Hobbs 
Act jurisdiction, because the connection 
between the robbery and interstate commerce is 
too attenuated. 
Id. 
 Here, as in Walker, the link between the robbery and 
interstate commerce is more direct than in the cases Powell 
cites.  The testimony at trial, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, established that Powell and his 
accomplices deliberately selected store owners as their 
victims, seeking to steal the stores’ earnings and assets.  The 
robbers decided not to commit the robberies at the stores only 
because they believed it was too risky.  Although we have yet 
to decide the issue,7
                                              
7 In Walker, we suggested in a footnote that because the 
defendants were “motivated by [the victim’s] connection to 
interstate commerce,” the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional nexus 
was satisfied.  657 F.3d at 182 n.16. 
 our sister circuits have held that such 
targeting satisfies the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional nexus.  See, 
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e.g., United States v. Le, 256 F.3d 1229, 1237 n.8 (11th Cir. 
2001) (“Our conclusion that Le’s actions implicated interstate 
commerce to a degree sufficient to create jurisdiction under 
the Hobbs Act is based on the fact that Le specifically 
targeted business assets that were temporarily kept at a 
private residence which, if stolen, had the potential to delay 
or obstruct the purchase of products from another state.”); 
United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 
2001) (“What sets this case apart is the fact that the role of the 
Martins with regard to their business, which was directly 
engaged in interstate commerce, was not coincidental. Rather, 
the Court is convinced by the evidence presented at trial that 
appellants targeted the Martins because of their interest in 
Rosa Medical Center.” (emphasis removed)); United States v. 
Nguyen, 246 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (jurisdictional nexus 
met in home robbery because “the evidence clearly shows 
that the conspirators planned to steal the earnings of a 
business in interstate commerce.”).  Such targeting also likely 
satisfies the standards outlined in Wang and similar cases as 
an instance when the robbery of an individual nonetheless 
affects interstate commerce.  See Perrotta, 313 F.3d at 37-38 
(“The [Hobbs Act’s] jurisdictional nexus could be satisfied by 
showing that the victim directly participated in interstate 
commerce; that the victim was targeted because of her status 
as an employee at a company participating in interstate 
commerce; that the harm or potential harm to the individual 
would deplete the assets of a company engaged in interstate 
commerce; [or] that the crime targeted the assets of a business 
rather than an individual.”) (citations omitted); Wang, 222 
F.3d at 240 (“[T]he Government might make such a showing 
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[of a robbery’s substantial connection to interstate commerce] 
by demonstrating that the defendant knew of or was 
motivated by the individual victim’s connection to interstate 
commerce.”); Collins, 40 F.3d at 100 (“Criminal acts directed 
toward individuals may violate section 1951(a) only if: (1) the 
acts deplete the assets of an individual who is directly and 
customarily engaged in interstate commerce; (2) if the acts 
cause or create the likelihood that the individual will deplete 
the assets of an entity engaged in interstate commerce; or (3) 
if the number of individuals victimized or the sum at stake is 
so large that there will be some ‘cumulative effect on 
interstate commerce.’” (citations omitted)). 
 Despite this line of cases, Powell argues that what he 
terms the “targeting theory” is inapposite.  He asserts that, 
because nearly every robbery targets moneys or goods 
obtained in interstate commerce, the theory collapses any 
jurisdictional limit on the Hobbs Act’s reach.  Next, in a 
contention advanced primarily at oral argument, he suggests 
that the targeting theory’s focus on intent may be appropriate 
for a Hobbs Act conspiracy or attempt charge, where the 
effect on commerce may only be potential, but is misapplied 
to the substantive charge, which purportedly requires an 
actual effect on interstate commerce for conviction. 
 We find these arguments unconvincing.  As to the first 
contention, Powell’s description of a robbery targeted at 
money and goods coincidentally obtained in interstate 
commerce is not the sort of targeting at issue here.  Powell 
did not rob his victims merely because he believed they had 
money or valuables, and these items happened to come from 
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interstate commerce, as Powell’s hypotheticals posit.  The 
link to commerce was more direct: Powell specifically 
targeted the proceeds of businesses engaged in interstate 
commerce.  Accordingly, although they took place outside the 
confines of the victims’ stores, the robberies here were 
nonetheless “directed at a business establishment,” which 
Powell concedes lies within Hobbs Act jurisdiction.  Br. for 
Appellant at 17.  Targeting of this sort satisfies the Hobbs 
Act’s jurisdictional nexus.   
 The second argument misstates circuit law.  As noted, 
we have held that the effect on interstate commerce required 
for a Hobbs Act conviction need only be “potential,” and 
have never limited this standard solely to convictions for 
Hobbs Act conspiracy.  See Urban, 404 F.3d at 765-66 & n.3 
(endorsing, after a lengthy discussion, the use of the 
“potential” effect on commerce standard in “the context of 
substantive Hobbs Act cases”); Haywood, 363 F.3d at 209-10 
(citing precedent that the effect on commerce need only be 
potential in upholding a conviction for a substantive Hobbs 
Act violation).  We have also observed that, although some 
circuits have adopted a requirement of an actual effect in 
substantive cases, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 308 
F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Carcione, 272 
F.3d 1297, 1300-01 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001), the weight of 
authority endorses the position we have adopted, see Urban, 
404 F.3d at 766 n.3 (collecting cases).   
Conviction under the Hobbs Act does not require proof 
that the defendant intended to affect interstate commerce.  See 
Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 6.18.1951-7 
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(2010).  But the defendant’s intent is nonetheless relevant, 
because the government may establish the jurisdictional 
nexus by demonstrating that the “natural consequences” of 
the robbery would result in an effect on interstate commerce, 
Urban, 404 F.3d at 762, and intent is probative, although not 
dispositive, on this question.  Here, Powell deliberately 
sought to rob business owners to obtain proceeds of 
businesses engaged in interstate commerce.  This targeting 
and the resultant robberies of those owners were sufficient for 
a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
“natural consequences” of Powell’s actions were an actual or 
potential effect on interstate commerce.  
 There was also sufficient evidence to sustain Powell’s 
conviction under what we have termed “the depletion of the 
assets” theory, “whereby proof that a Hobbs Act violation 
depletes the assets of a business engaged in interstate 
commerce conclusively establishes the effect on commerce 
requirement.” Urban, 404 F.3d at 762.  In Urban, we 
comprehensively surveyed our precedent, as well as that of 
our sister circuits, and found repeated and unequivocal 
endorsement of the application of this standard to Hobbs Act 
violations.  Id. at 763-66 & n.3; see also Haywood, 363 F.3d 
at 210; United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 423-24 (3d Cir. 
1979); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 642-43 (3d Cir. 
1975) (en banc).  Our sister circuits have specifically applied 
the theory to uphold Hobbs Act convictions for home 
robberies that seized business assets.  See United States v. 
Jimenez-Torres, 435 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Depletion of 
the assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce is a 
common method for demonstrating that a robbery had an 
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effect on interstate commerce. This is so even if the 
business’s assets were stolen from a home.” (citation 
omitted)). 
The undisputed evidence at trial established that 
Powell and his accomplices stole business assets in both 
robberies: approximately $2300 from Star Wigs,8
In sum, the circumstances of this case—where the 
 and $140 
and credit card receipts from Dollar Plus.  Although the 
amount taken in the Dollar Plus robbery was comparatively 
small, we have never suggested that a robbery can affect 
commerce only if a substantial amount of a business’s assets 
are stolen.  See Walker, 657 F.3d at 180 (rejecting argument 
that robbery of drug dealer of $60 in cocaine and $40-$50 in 
cash did not affect interstate commerce because “we have 
found the de minimis standard satisfied in similarly low-
stakes robberies”); Haywood, 363 F.3d at 211 & n.7 
(upholding a Hobbs Act conviction based on depletion of 
assets because of theft of $50-$70 in cash from a bar).  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, there was sufficient evidence to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the theft of business assets in the two 
robberies had an actual or potential de minimis effect on 
interstate commerce. 
                                              
8 Consistent with our standard of review, we construe the 
dispute over the amount taken in the Y.B. robbery in the light 
most favorable to the government.  But our conclusion would 
be the same if the robbery had only netted $1060 in business 
proceeds. 
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evidence established that Powell and his accomplices targeted 
interstate businesses and stole business proceeds—support a 
rational jury’s conclusion that the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional 
nexus was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.  The fact that 
the robbers believed it would be easier and more profitable to 
commit their crimes at business owners’ homes, rather than in 
the stores they owned, cannot be read to negate the robberies’ 
effect on interstate commerce and defeat otherwise available 
federal jurisdiction. 
B. 
Powell also challenges the District Court’s jury 
instructions with respect to the interstate commerce prong of 
a Hobbs Act violation.9
The third element that the government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
(name)’s conduct affected or could have 
affected interstate commerce.   Conduct affects 
interstate commerce if it in any way interferes 
  At trial, the government proposed the 
Third Circuit model jury instruction for the required Hobbs 
Act element of effect on interstate commerce that read: 
                                              
9 We review a district court’s refusal to give a certain 
instruction for abuse of discretion, but exercise plenary 
review to determine whether the jury instructions stated the 
proper legal standard.  United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 
642 (3d Cir. 2006).  We consider the jury instructions as a 
totality and do not evaluate particular sentences or paragraphs 
in isolation.  Id. 
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with, changes, or alters the movement or 
transportation or flow of goods, merchandise, 
money, or other property in commerce between 
or among the states.  The effect can be minimal. 
It is not necessary to prove that (name) 
intended to obstruct, delay or interfere with 
interstate commerce or that the purpose of the 
alleged crime was to affect interstate commerce.  
Further, you do not have to decide whether the 
effect on interstate commerce was to be harmful 
or beneficial to a particular business or to 
commerce in general.  You do not even have to 
find that there was an actual effect on 
commerce.  All that is necessary to prove is that 
the natural consequences of the offense 
potentially caused an effect on interstate 
commerce to any degree, however minimal or 
slight. 
 
Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 6.18.1951-7 
(2009).  The government also proposed an additional 
paragraph describing the depletion of the assets theory 
endorsed in Urban, 404 F.3d at 763-67.10
                                              
10 That paragraph read: 
  Powell objected 
You can, but are not required to, find an effect 
on interstate commerce if the defendant’s 
actions reduced the assets of a business engaged 
or purchasing goods or services in interstate 
commerce, which assets would otherwise have 
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and proposed an alternate instruction that would require the 
jury to find a substantial connection between the individual 
robbed and a business engaged in interstate commerce for 
conviction.11
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
rejecting Powell’s proposed instruction.  The instruction 
given reflected circuit precedent by requiring the government 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an actual or potential de 
minimis effect on interstate commerce for conviction.  We 
interpret the addition of the “depletion of the assets” 
paragraph not to supplant or expand the standard outlined in 
the model instruction, but to exemplify one way the required 
nexus can be established.  See Walker, 657 F.3d at 183 
(“[W]hile the government can and often will rely upon the 
  The District Court charged the jury with the 
instruction as proposed by the government. 
                                                                                                     
been available for conducting the purchase of 
such goods or services in interstate commerce. 
App. for Appellant at 561a. 
11 Powell’s proposed instruction read, in relevant part: 
Where the robbery is of an individual in his or 
her home, and the Government seeks to prove 
an effect on interstate commerce by showing a 
connection between an individual victim and a 
business engaged in interstate commerce, that 
connection must be a substantial one – not one 
that is fortuitous or speculative. 
App. for Appellant at 562a. 
21 
 
depletion of assets theory, it is only required to present 
evidence proving that the ‘defendants’ conduct produces any 
interference with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether 
slight, subtle, or even potential.’” (quoting Haywood, 363 
F.3d at 209-10)).  Here, as in Urban and Haywood, the 
application of the theory is unproblematic.  
In declining to explicitly require a substantial 
connection between the robbery of an individual and 
interstate commerce for conviction under the Hobbs Act, we 
do not suggest that Hobbs Act jurisdiction is limitless.  Our 
precedent has underscored the concern that the prevalence of 
interstate commerce in our modern society could elevate 
garden-variety street crime to federal Hobbs Act offenses, 
thereby “supplanting the state criminal systems that quite ably 
address classic state-law crimes.”  Walker, 657 F.3d at 184; 
see also Jimenez-Torres, 435 F.3d at 7-8 (“Where . . . the 
crime concerns the robbery of a home rather than of a 
business, we approach the task of applying the de minimis 
standard with some caution, lest every robbery (which by 
definition has some economic component) become a federal 
crime.”).  Like the Wang line of cases, we would likely find 
problematic Hobbs Act prosecutions for robberies that 
“cause[] only a speculative indirect effect on a business 
engaged in interstate commerce,” 222 F.3d at 238; cf. United 
States v. McGuire, 178 F.3d 203, 209-12 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(finding insufficient evidence of effect of interstate commerce 
under 18 U.S.C. § 844, the federal arson statute, where 
defendant blew up a car containing a bottle of orange juice 
that had traveled in interstate commerce and was intended for 
a local catering business). 
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But this case demonstrates the contrary hazard in 
adopting a bright-line rule that sharply differentiates a home 
from business premises for the purposes of Hobbs Act 
jurisdiction.  As discussed, the facts of this case, where 
robbers targeted two businesses engaged in interstate 
commerce to obtain their proceeds, place it within Hobbs Act 
jurisdiction.  This case differs from the typical Hobbs Act 
prosecution of a business holdup only because the robbers 
elected to rob business owners at their homes, not in their 
stores.   The critical question under the Hobbs Act is the 
robbery’s effect on interstate commerce; where the robbery 
occurs is but one factor in assessing this issue. See Carcione, 
272 F.3d at 1301 n.6 (“[I]n determining whether there is a 
minimal effect on commerce [under the Hobbs Act], each 
case must be decided on its own facts.” (quoting United 
States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1245 (11th Cir. 2000))). 
In short, the District Court’s instruction accurately 
stated circuit law on the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional nexus. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction and sentence. 
